Introduction
Over the two decades since the end of the Cold War, international policies in East Asia has experienced paradigm changes more than twice. The first big threshold in history for most East Asian states was the abrupt breakdown of the bipolar system that had overshadowed the region with a half-century confrontation between superpowers. Not just small and middle-sized countries such as the two Koreas and Taiwan, but great powers such as China and Japan had to adjust themselves to the dramatic changes of surrounding political configurations. The change became an opportunity as well as a challenge for East Asia. In a sense, the end of the long Cold War might have been a blessing for the region as it allowed a more open and diversified policy options available for them to get out of the previous ideological trap imposed by superpowers. Countries in the region might have expected a new breakthroughs toward a more peaceful and cooperative relationship between themselves.
The second paradigmatic change was encroaching on East Asia in a more silent way, while it was a clamorous event at the global level, particularly to the United States. The 9/11 terror targeted at the heart of the unipolar empire had made the United States to revamp its own grand strategy and foreign policy as well as domestic institutions against any further terrorist attacks. The repercussions from America had left long tails in East Asia, a region which had long been overshadowed by the offshore hegemony. Military operations in the Middle East by the United States after the 9/11 attack have had serious impacts on its security commitments to East Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea. The United States Forces deployed in these allied countries have also been realigned along with a new foreign policy initiative by the Bush Administration. While East Asian counties could not choose but supporting the aggressive American posture against new enemies, they had to feel misgivings about any possible abandonment by the old friend. As such, beginning in the 21 st century, the United States seemed to have disassociated itself from East Asia for a decade.
As decade-long missions of the United States have been dragged on with no definite victory in the Middle East, the new Administration by Barack Obama decided to wrap up those national missions soon.
and its implications will also be introduced in the section. The third section, as a theoretical counterpart of the previous section, is devoted to explaining the "bias" of great power politics in the realist paradigm when it is applied to East Asia. The fourth section illuminates three realist myths that have been frequently proposed in the discourse of East Asian international politics. Theoretical implications of these myths will be discussed in order to fill the gaps between the realist paradigm and the reality.
Pivot or Trap? Backgrounds of America's Return to East Asia
The "Pivot to Asia" was a foreign policy trademark of the new administration that reoriented its attention back to East Asia as the most vital interest to America. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which was published in 2010, focused on reforming Bush's foreign policy framework and changing the order of the United States' top priorities from the Middle East and Europe to East Asia. The QDDR also proposed the triple axis of American foreign policy composed of defense, diplomacy and development. 1) The United States would have to take a smart approach in order to adapt to changing political environments of the 1) Foreign aid of the United States has expanded since the 9/11 incident, which was intended to match not only humanitarian demands but also security concerns. The Bush Administration has emphasized the significance of the strategic approach in implementing foreign aid programs, and added the mission of foreign development as one element of the triple axis for national security (Lugar 3). in crisis management and conflict resolution. A full spectrum of public diplomacy for the strategy of engagement towards other countries was declared in the QDDR as the prime target of the Obama Administration. 2) Europe had been distanced from the American concerns since the 9/11 attack, while the civil war in Ukraine and consequent energy problems have retaken them. During the first ten years of the 21 st century, the NATO had been the last test case for America to decide to intervene in European affairs when any of its allies are attacked from outside. However, the problem for the United States is not so much a security commitment for Europe as the internal division among allies over burden-sharing. As the continent has lost its motives for a strong security alliance after the Cold War, more countries have tended toward a "free-riding" strategy in providing collective goods. America has revealed its interests in several regional forums and arrangements in Asia, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asian Summit (EAS), ASEAN+3, and the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD). 5) The
Six-Party Talks for the North Korean nuclear issue and the idea of "minilateralism" have disclosed a new type of American involvements in the region. As such, the United States has started to display its own big stakes in the East Asia. 6) 4) For these missions, Hillary Clinton suggested the following three objectives: political agreements over core goals of alliance, supports for allies' rapid adaptation to new challenges, and capacity-building for allies in deterring various states and non-state actors (Clinton 58). 5) For a detailed discussion on the institutions of regional cooperation in Asia, see
Wesley. 6) Scholars have proposed that American decision-makers should consider the "minilateral" approach which intends to narrow down the range of cooperation only among friendly allies. This is to overcome the problem of "free-riding" so that the United States may have to find out a small "magic" number for cooperation in America had preferred a "divide-and-rule" strategy for maintaining its predominant role in East Asia during the Cold War era. It was obvious in its "hub-and-spoke" type in alliance management, unlike the multilateral architecture of the NATO 
The Bias of Great Power Politics in East Asia
According to Kenneth Waltz, great powers "write" the history of international politics. The "structure" of world system has been generated by those great powers, so the "theory" of international politics should also be concentrated on them This is because the relative rise of China will shake the power structure in the region (Mearsheimer 400) . However, the history shows a rather crooked and mixed result: while America has chosen the second scenario, it has been committed to engagement in rather than containment of China. This mixed strategy was embedded in the neoliberal self-esteem over democracy and market economy: the primary goal of America over the rise of China has been to change it into a "responsible stakeholder" in the global community (Etzioni 541). 9)
The biased framework of great power in explaining power relationships in East Asia seems relevant. However, in many aspects, East Asia is quite distinctive in applying the framework of power politics without any revisions. First of all, we have to understand historical backgrounds of the great power bias of the realist paradigm. In its literal meaning, "great power" is a state with extraordinarily large capabilities in economy and military forces, with its global interests and its will to protect those interests (Neack 140).
9) This policy was "misguided," according to Mearsheimer, because a wealthy China would not become a "status quo" power but an aggressive one who is determined to aim regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 402 ).
Thus, great powers are defined as the "organizations for power as the last resort for war" (Taylor xxiv) . A club of five to six great powers had been organized in Europe since the Napoleonic War, which worked as the main moderator of power politics. The great power club had sustained itself not so much upon global motivations as upon their own self-interests. Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Prussia, Russia and France were members of this club. Great powers had frequently used forces to promote common goals among themselves, so that they were regarded as strong enough to effectively wage war without calling on other countries or allies. In the 20 th century, the notion of "great powers" emerged as representing the states which are ready to use force whenever they want and be ready to bear costs. Any country, beyond preconditions such as population and economic capability, is a great power if it would use force "undeterred" by the prospects of predictable casualties and material costs within limits (Luttwak 23 ).
Throughout the 19 th century, great powers in Europe had claimed special privileges for themselves and responsibilities which they would not share with small countries. They assumed their role as the protectors of the Peace of Europe, and they were willing to take the responsibility of maintaining order in the post-War Europe. The history of this "exclusive club" among great powers in the 19 th century Europe pushes us to rethink about the status and role of great powers in contemporary world politics. What this story of the great power of Europe in the 19 th century tells is that the relative size of population, economic and military capabilities is not the only indicator of great power. In the 19 th century, the notion of "great power" assumed the "exclusiveness" of the club or a common identity as well as a role recognition for the system stability even though it was not like a hegemonic system. That's why small states of Europe accepted the preeminence of great powers and placed themselves under the patronage. As great powers had taken special responsibilities for small members' safety and well-being, it was natural for those clients to expect special commitments by strong powers against external threats, domestic instability and financial troubles (Bridge and Bullen 2).
What if we apply the notion of great powers to East Asia? As many scholars have accustomed themselves to explaining power dynamics of the region between the United States, China, Japan and Russia, the existence of "great powers" in the region seems to be relevant in discussing international politics of East Asia. 10) At the least, East Asia is the place where these great powers have co-existed and competed among themselves for more than a century.
The emergence of Japan and China in the 20 th century has heightened the imperative for the region to be understood in terms of great power politics. However, the features of the 19 th -century Europe cannot be observed so well in East Asia, which was necessary for the club of great powers to hold a common identity. For example, the structure of opposition between the United States and China (or the Soviet Union) in the Cold War era had not been something like that of the 19 th -century Europe. This makes us to be cautious in 10) Scholars have focused on the "strategic quadrangle" among the four-power relationship in East Asia, while some of them see it as the "greatest threat" to regional stability and economic interdependence (Shirk 246). applying the "great power" framework to East Asia.
In terms of the relevance of the notion of great powers in East Asia, it makes sense if we apply it to the status of rising China. By now, China has been described by the West as ambitious over disputed territories, claiming to reassert itself with glorious history, and determined not to be bothered by other countries in seeking its own interests (Economist, "What China Wants"). However, scholarly discourses and media coverage over China as well as politicians' opinions have been dominated by the "great power bias." However, those discussions have never distinguished a variety of great powers from a single hegemon to a group of parallel powers. For example, China has been described as a "challenger to hegemony" or a "great power" without clear definitions. Theoretically, a hegemon is assumed to hold both material capabilities and the willingness to maintain the order of a whole system. It assumes a leadership role at the global level with legitimacy and consensus. Therefore, it is more appropriate not to use the term "hegemony" to tell the threats and negative impacts of rising China. China can be recognized neither as a "hegemon" nor a "challenger to hegemony" because it has yet taken enough responsibilities at the global level. Also it has never been global in its ambitions for a greater influence; it has been and is so only at the regional level.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to call China a "great power" more at the regional level than at the global level. The term "great power"
should not be applied to East Asia in its original meaning of the traditional European system. As its usage is so limited in explaining power dynamics of East Asia that we have to be careful in the bias of great powers. We may have to replace "great powers" with "regional powers" in order to explain power dynamics in East Asia in a more appropriate manner. Regional powers are unlikely to seek allies out of fear that any global hegemon poses threats. Thus threats of rising China would be different between at the regional level and at the global level. In a case when China may seek an alliance, it should be targeted to any regional, not global, threats from its neighbors or enemy alliances. Regional powers cannot affect global power dynamics so much that their interests are placed only at a regional level . 11) As such, the existing discussions over the rise of China have confused between traditional notions of great powers and a scaled-down version of regional powers. East
Asia may need the latter notion for explaining the rise of China.
However, unfortunately, East Asia has been treated as one of many regions like Europe, even though each of them hold unique experiences and histories of their own. This is called the "great power bias" of realism in which a common identity among great powers or the existence of small powers are ignored. In the next section, let's get deeper into the details of the great power bias by discussing the three "myths" of the realist propositions in understanding the American return to East Asia.
11) Stephen Walt proposed the theory of balance of threat in order to revise the conventional theory of balance of power. According to him, states respond not so much to powers as threats of other counties, so the intention of a country is more important than power in estimating the dynamics of international politics .
Myths of the American Return to East Asia
The bias of great power politics has generated a lot of misunderstandings and under-theories of East Asian international politics. The case of the U.S. return to East Asia, in this context, would be interpreted as an example of balance of power between the declining hegemon, the United States, and the rising China as a challenger. This paper argues that this old frame cannot be applied to the region anymore because of its legacy rooted in the bias of the realist paradigm. As such, in this section, three myths of the realist paradigm in its dealing with the return of America in the region are discussed. The first myth considers the proposition by offensive realism as it explains the rise of China mere as a challenge to the existing hegemony. The second myth discusses the bias of the structural theory of realism as it ignores the micro-dimensions of world politics so much. The third myth, focusing on the simplicities of the rationality assumption, is related to the relevance of applying the idea of rational deterrence to the case of East Asia. The factor of emotions, as an alternative to the realist paradigm, will be discussed with its implications to theorizing East Asia.
Myth 1: The Struggle for Hegemony in East Asia?
The rise of China and the American strategy toward China have often been explained in the framework of hegemonic competition.
While China has been recognized as a challenger to the American hegemony in the region, we have to acknowledge that both rising China and declining America may not fit into hegemonic competition.
Charles Kindleberger, who proposed the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), has distinguished "leadership" from "dominance" in the sense that the dominance means only a country dominating another.
According to his theory, the dominated one has to consider what the dominant does while the latter does not so. On the other hand, the leadership implies a country that persuades others to follow a given course of rules and institutions which would be beneficial to their interests if followed. This is the way many organizations and Gilpin). This makes sense as far as we do not distinguish the term domination and hegemony. While the former notion considers only the beneficial aspect for the stronger power, the latter presents a more sophisticated idea about the leadership with its willingness to keep system stability as well as enough capability to do so. This is particularly so in the phenomena of collective action which are not always conflicts among countries. In a collective action such as an alliance, small or weak partners tend to free-ride on system maintenance. This means that small countries do not contribute proportional to their capabilities, while large partners have to spend more resources relative to their powers. In any collective system composed of states with different power levels, no individual state has an incentive voluntarily to contribute enough goods for maintaining the system. This free-riding tendency is particularly severe in case of smaller states as their contributions may not have any impact on the system. So there will be a consequent tendency for stronger powers to bear a disproportionate share of the costs for system maintenance. In many cases of international collaborations and security alliances, small partners would be attracted to "neutral" or "passive" foreign policies . Thus the problems of suboptimality and disproportionality in collective action have become perennial issues for security alliances.
According to the theory of collective action, therefore, bigger countries tend to bear more burdens and responsibilities for the system. In East Asia, we may expect neither rising China nor declining America willing to take these obligations. So the term "hegemonic" competition may not be applied to the Sino-American relations in the region. If we consider the trend of globalization and its impacts on domestic societies, the nature of "non-hegemonic" struggles between strong powers becomes clear. As the process of globalization has accelerated its speed, the scale of goods and assets has also expanded so that it has differentiated public and private goods from each other. Large countries tend to be more influenced by this trend, which will lead to the emergence of "residual states" that do not work like centralized nation-states anymore. The cost of large countries with more open, more globalized, and more democratic procedures cannot be motivated to work like small states in responding to outside pressures . China and the United States, in this context, are not "residual states" but still centralized "strong powers" without any hegemonic motivations in East Asia.
In a sense, the competition between China and America in East Asia may be understood in a less strict form of hegemony. This tells a more persuasive story over the behavioral patterns of both countries in the region as they have advanced their interests through non-coercive means under the strategy of "cooperative hegemony,"
which implies an active role in institutionalization at the regional level with diverse types of incentives. Many regions in the world have achieved cooperation through an active initiative of great powers which have asymmetric level of resources but more willingness to keep regional peace and stability. This is different from the conventional notion of hegemony which was applied to the leadership at the global level. 12) In this way, a cooperative hegemon seeks advantages from the strategy of institutionalization at the regional level, which comprehends power aggregation, economic and security stability, inclusion and access to resources, and diffusion of ideas . This is an alternative explanatory framework for the Sino-American confrontation in East Asia beyond the conventional theory of hegemonic stability.
Another revision of the conventional HST is to be done by considering the role of non-great-powers in collective actions.
Whereas the conventional HST has not put so much stress on the status of middle-to-small powers, scholars have added more on its theoretical applicability. These middle and small powers have taken 12) A "cooperative hegemony" implies a soft rule within cooperative arrangements so that concept is based upon a hybrid approach between idealism and realism (Pedersen 683). As such, the concept of cooperative hegemony was intended to revise and narrow down the traditional notion of hegemony. In the same context, South Korea and Japan can take similar roles in their impacts on great power politics in East Asia, while it is still disputable whether we can call these countries "swing states." Rising China and declining America cannot stand still without considering the roles of the "k-group" or "swing states" in their projects for the supremacy in East Asia.
The pattern of "buck-passing" has been well known in foreign policy as the structure of world system becomes multipolar in the post-Cold War era. In a multipolar system, the number of membership is important in achieving system-wide cooperation. As great powers are also trying to maximize their own interests, they had better pass the buck to allies as well as adversaries. This is a way of free-riding by great powers in collective action. More countries tend to pass the bucks in this multipolar and complex system, unlike in the bipolar system where power asymmetry does not allow superpowers to ignore their responsibilities (Posen 63-64).
As such, the tendency of buck-passing by the United States in East
Asia implies a paradigm change: It has tried to turn its East Asian alliance to an "intermediate group" which allows more than one members to have incentives to share the burden from a "privileged group" in which only one member takes that responsibility (Olson 50) . In this way, we may loosen strict conditions of the HST and revise it in order to explicate East Asian power politics with the ideas of cooperative hegemony, k-group, swing states, and buckpassing behaviors of great powers.
Myth 2: Do Actors Structurally Balance Each Other?
Balance of power has been an organizing principle and an ordinary rule in international politics. For more than three hundred years this principle has been working automatically among great powers, so that it has provided a way to predict major patterns of international politics (Sheehan 163 ). That's why many realists have focused on analyzing the dynamic aspect of balancing behavior. They have witnessed the balancing behavior as an autonomous and voluntary system for equilibrium and harmony since the seventeenth century. In historical contexts, balance of power has been evolved as a behavioral pattern in international politics, like that of a market mechanism in economic relations. As such, in the eyes of realists, a stable and peaceful international system with autonomous balancing mechanisms among great powers would be possible. As every state follows its own interest, peace and prosperity would be guaranteed for all in a secured way. As such, the realist theory of international politics has relied so much on the "structural" mechanism of balancing among great powers that it has left some loopholes to think when we apply it to East Asia.
The biggest problem of the "structural" balancing model is that it has not existed in real-world situations. Scholars have investigated its history and found that a balance of power system has not been working so well as the theory proposed. counter-evidence against the balance of power theory. The abnormal patterns of buck-passing and chain-gaining behaviors by great powers are also reducing the relevance of the theory. These deviant cases are called "pathologies" of the balance of power model in a multipolar world system . In reality, we have observed so many cases in which balancing did not happen so that we feel obliged to search for a new theory.
One way to alternative paths for the realist trap is to focus on micro-level factors. As the realist paradigm has been too much dependent on the structural approach of Waltz, it has lost its motivations for identifying idiographic aspects of international politics.
Now we may narrow down the level of analysis in order to
overcome these structural bias. Then we may equip ourselves with analytic tools for non-great powers' behavior. It would compel us to understand not as a product of structure but as that of individual choices. 14) Political outcomes may be better explained, in this micro-level framework, as the combination of individual preferences and the influence of systemic institutions around diverse actors. Like any other political processes, international politics is also a "social choice" process (Morrow 95) . In this social system of choices, political outcomes are determined by the interaction between preferences and structure, so that we observe the process of bargaining, diplomacy, and war as main phenomena in international political relations. These micro-level aspects also reveals how 14) For example, the Iraq war can be understood less as a product of systemic imperatives than a war of choice. We may introduce so many factors such as domestic interests, transnational networks, and emotional fear that had made the United States initiate the war (Hinnebusch 461) . 15) Among many options against outside threats, the most frequent one selected by weak states has been nonalignment, and the next one "balancing with great powers" for a free-rise or fight. As long as the patrons of great powers are available, the option of "balancing with great powers" has been the first priority for many weak states . 16) According to historians, Japan and China in World War I, and small countries in Southeastern Europe in World War II chose their strategies in a mixed way between balancing and bandwagoning .
intention over the region even without considering any possibility of balancing them.
The theory of balance of power can also be complemented by considering the differentiation among states not just along capabilities but also along functions. Whereas Waltz assumed functional similarities among states with the notion of "like-units," it was so restricted in its application to many other historical and regional situations. States may be positioned in the hierarchical structure according to their "power" levels, but they can also be positioned in the horizontal structure according to their special "functions." This is because states tend to become specialized in the path dependent international system which has been tailored and optimized for each of them. Therefore, the principle for individual states to take is not only that of "self-help" in anarchy but also that of "specialization" in a harmonious world (Schroeder 125) . This idea of horizontal specialization in the role of diverse states helps us explain the cooperative as well as competitive relations between America, China, and other East Asian countries who play relevant roles as a nuclear umbrella (America), a world factory (China), a regional financial axis (Japan), a buffer zone (South Korea) and so on. If we interpret international politics in East Asia in this way, we will find the logic and prediction of the balance of power theory less persuasive.
At the same time, the idea of the "Concert of Europe" among great powers, rather than that of a structural balance, may suggest another scenario for settling the role of the United States and China in East Asia. The notion has its origin in the European great power system of the 19 th century. While the period was characterized both by balance of power and by the Concert system, the latter differs from the former in that there were highly self-conscious level of cooperation among great powers. Balancing between great powers may be either cooperative or competitive upon specific power configurations, but the Concert had had more effects on strong states' capabilities as it had institutionalized mutual and self-restrained We may expect a more practical and optimistic prediction over the cooperation in East Asia as the region has accumulated enough experience in multilateral cooperation across diverse issue-areas than the old European balancing powers. The Six-Party Talks has been one of successful cases, despite its current deadlock, as all great powers and concerned parties have joined like that of the old Concert of Europe.
Myth 3: Are Rising Powers Rationally Deterred?
Regarding the third myth of the realist paradigm in its application
to East Asia, we may ask whether China has been deterred by the returning America. Deterrence is a policy seeking to "persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force will outweigh the benefits" (Huth 15 ). The fundamental problem of deterrence is how to use threats to induce the opponent to behave in desirable ways. Underlying this problem of deterrence exists the assumption of rationality, which is logically
17) The Concert model works under the condition that is a fairly well-established rules for state behavior. In this context, the Concert assumes a practicable and realistic system to comply with, collective responsibilities shared among great powers, and great powers' consensus regardless of their ideologies .
compelling but seriously deficient in its application to real-world situations. While the theory of rational deterrence has been well-established by the realist paradigm, it has been criticized for its rigorous assumptions: Actors are exogenously given their preferences and choice options; actors seek to optimize their subjective utilities; differences between actors' opportunities explain variations in outcomes; and states work as a unitary rational actor . Although these simple assumptions make logical inferences consistent and coherent, they are so distant from the reality that we need adjustments.
The original theory of deterrence, proposed by Thomas Schelling, was intended to explain the special relation between the United States and the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons as massively destructive threats. In its logical processing, the theory of deterrence allows the "I expect that you expect…" sequence to converge on a common single point of attention which Schelling emphasized in explaining the equilibrium of deterrence. The point was to be easily recognizable thresholds that emerge from ambiguous and complex interactions with combinations of capabilities and coercion between nuclear superpowers . As such, the notion of deterrence was founded upon the perception of mutual interactions that engender the possibility of reaching a stable point where a country is satisfied with the response of another country. These complex processes have been explained by the analogy of "exchange of hostages" that implies massive destructive power on both sides; then the balance of terror amounts to a tacit consensus supported by a total exchange of all conceivable hostages . In this context, indiscriminate disarmaments of all types of weapons would produce instability rather than stability.
The logic of rational deterrence, therefore, seems more complex than its appearance. Schelling discussed about this point well when he put his focus on the dimensions of "bargaining" and "conventional stopping places" like geographical demarcation lines between the deterring country and the deterred one. Here were involved more psychology and customs than the mathematics of warfare. Threats and demands, proposals and counter-proposals, reassurances and concessions, signals and tolerances, reputations and lessons are being communicated and bargained between both parties of deterrence .
In this complex situation, deterrence is achieved when a potential enemy, fearing unacceptable retaliation, decides to forgo a planned offensive. The state, as a rational actor, calculates costs and benefits of probable consequences, which is a type of instrumental rationality . Whereas realist theorists have provided the deterrence framework in an articulate way, their assumptions are too simple to apply them to the real world because of the sensitivity to dynamic changes, unpredictable consequences, the process of adaptation, and evolution over time. 18) Another point in evaluating the theory of deterrence in East Asia is that we have to pay more attention to the working mechanisms of deterrence which are non-rational. It does not mean that we need an "irrational" framework but that we have to investigate the role of 18) As such, some scholars have developed a new framework for the "complex deterrence" to be applied to ambiguous deterrence relationship, which is caused by fluid structural elements of the international system (Paul 8).
"non-rational" factors such as passion and emotions. Then the understanding of deterrence between great powers may be so different from the conventional framework of rational deterrence. In reality, the world of the 21 st century has been changed so much since that of nuclear confrontation between very rational superpowers. Now we do not expect any situation in which great powers restrain themselves with uncompromising nuclear capabilities. More attention must be given to the way of asymmetric competitions, non-traditional warfare such as terrorism, and people's propensity toward emotional reactions. In this way, emotional factors such as anger, shame and humiliation became an integral part of Chinese nationalism not just in a xenophobic way but also in a self-critical manner ).
What we need to supplement the conventional theory of rational deterrence, in this sense, is the factor of non-rational interactions like 
Conclusion
America's interests in East Asia have been diversified at the global level in the 21 st century. One of those implemented in East Asia, the policy toward rising China, might be explained by several conceptual tools of the realist paradigm. However, as discussed in previous sections, the realist theory has been tainted by many biases. The external threats. What Chinese people wanted in this nationalistic framework as not just the "others" like Japan and the West, but also the reflexive itself upon self-criticism . International politics in East Asia has been frequently explained and accessed by the realist theories and practices due to its own path dependence for more than a century. While acknowledging the merits of realism in explaining power dynamics of East Asia, this paper suggested several ways to supplement its limitations. As the second decade in the 21 st century has witnessed the return of the United
States to East Asia after a long excursion to the Middle East, we may need to reframe to understand the power politics in the region.
The realist paradigm, with its main concepts such as hegemony, balance of power, and rational deterrence, has contributed to the development of explanatory frameworks for East Asia. On the other hand, deficiencies of the paradigm must be analyzed and complemented by new ideas and concepts that reflect new phenomena that are specific to this region. The variants of hegemonic system, the role of middle and weak powers and the k-group, a mixed strategy of balancing and bandwagoning, and the factor of emotion may increase the explanatory power of the existing framework. More works on theoretical integration among new theoretical tools and empirical tests should follow this introductory discussions.
